MIO°Village Gateway
Status

What is live, what is built, what is planned

Every claim these pages make about a product, with its status; each claim carries its own date, and the latest is 20 November 2026. This page is generated from the same register as status.json. Live means a customer uses it in production (today, Village™); available on request means built, tested and deployed and available to a customer on request; built, available on request means a feature built and tested and not yet switched on; built and deployed means built, tested and deployed and in use for named tenants only or not yet in use, as each entry states; a prototype is built and run in development, on our own machine or a test network, is not deployed to customers and is not audited; a statement describes the company, a standard, a definition or a policy and is not a product capability; planned and not built are not available. Statuses were established from the code and plans by AI agents working under John Stroh’s direction; no person has checked every line. MIO has not been formed and nothing here is an offer.

MIO and the platform

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
EST-01MIO is a proposed service company that would run and stand behind the commercial service around MDSL's products.Plannedit is proposed and has not been formed; no investment, ownership, distribution appointment or legal right has been agreed
EST-02MDSL owns the work and the infrastructure today. The code is proprietary; the Village Gateway is dealt with separately in GTW-06.Statementthis describes today only; what MIO would hold, and on what terms, is not settled and would be documented and negotiated; MDSL's intention to move what it has built towards open source, in stages, is recorded as intent only in EST-30; MDSL states nothing further here
EST-03No distributor has been appointed.Not builtthe first arrangement is meant to be built with the first distributor; it is an invitation to explore, not a franchise, an exclusive territory or an offer of employment
EST-04No distributor margin, wholesale rate, portal or distributor terms have been published or agreed with any distributor. A draft agreement and share schedule exist and have not been sent to anyone.Not builtterms are agreed directly with John Stroh under one standard share schedule; it is shown after a non-disclosure agreement and never at a first meeting; no distributor or practice rate is published; a distributor console exists in the platform behind sign-in and is not offered to anyone: no distributor has been appointed, no access has been issued, and nothing public links to it
EST-05Nothing is being offered: no investment, valuation, term sheet, exclusivity or commitment to appoint a distributor.Not builtconversations are by invitation; any commitment would follow diligence, agreed terms, professional advice and signed documents; nothing here is legal, tax, accounting, securities, investment or financial advice
EST-06A Village starts one of two ways. By invitation: an evaluation link MDSL issues to you starts a new Village, and an invitation from a Village that already exists brings you into that one. Or, where MDSL has opened self-service, you start a Village yourself with a verified payment card and no evaluation link. Every other product is available on request from MDSL. There is no free tier and no anonymous demo, and no Village starts without a verified payment card or a redeemed evaluation link. An evaluation link is a one-time link John Stroh issues, bound to one address; opening it starts a 30-day evaluation. On an evaluation the owner adds a payment card from the Village's Gateway page to start using Village Gateway categories; nothing is charged when it is added, and the first charge is on day 30 unless the owner cancels before then. On a Village started with a card, the first charge is 30 days after its owner opens it, and a Village that is never opened is never charged. Guest access to demonstration Villages is being closed.Liveself-service is opened host by host and only by MDSL: MDSL opens and closes it, it can be opened at the EU host only, and while it is closed the sign-up page says an evaluation link is needed and points to the request page, and an evaluation link is the way to start a Village (the request page is mysovereignty.digital/evaluation/request); a page that cannot tell whether self-service is open names the card route only with the words 'where MDSL has opened self-service' and never says it is open; self-service, as built: the card is verified by the payment provider, Airwallex (New Zealand), before the Village is created, the owner then gives their details and confirms their email address, no charge is made at setup, the 30 days run from the day the owner opens the Village, and a Village set up and never opened is released after 90 days; the first charge on a Village started with a card is made by the payment provider and, as at this date, has not yet happened on a real Village, and no Village set up this way has yet reached its 90 days; self-service has its own limit on new Villages, separate from the evaluation batches, a visitor over the limit is refused, and neither number is published; this entry says how a Village starts, not which Village Gateway functions it has: GTW-01 and GTW-14 say where Village Gateway is on; the self-service period is never described as free or as a trial: the wording is that the first charge is 30 days after the owner opens the Village; evaluation link: the 30-day evaluation is built; opening the link takes no card; the Village starts using Village Gateway categories once the owner adds a card from its Gateway page, nothing is charged when a card is added, and the first charge is on day 30 unless the owner cancels (as traced on 14 Nov 2026: with billing enforcement on at OVH, an evaluation Village is refused Gateway use until the card is added); the charge at day 30 is made by the payment provider and has not yet happened on a real evaluation; places are limited and released in batches at MDSL's discretion, the number is never published, and an unredeemed link lapses; the batch release has an operator screen; closing guest demo access is decided and in build; the offline checkers are downloadable for inspection (EST-38), which is not a free tier and not a licence; the self-service route was built and reviewed by AI agents, and no person has audited it
EST-07Records are stored with hosting providers in France and New Zealand; neither is US-owned.Livethis covers where records are stored; TLS certificates come from Let's Encrypt (a US non-profit), AVA™ sends its questions to AI assistants run mostly by US companies, and the public-randomness network planned for audit sampling includes US operators
EST-08No US-owned provider hosts or stores the records.Livethis is a statement about hosting and storage of records only; it does not extend to every dependency
EST-09Per-record time stamps come from Certum (Poland), a non-qualified service; the daily estate root also carries a stamp from the Portuguese state's Cartão de Cidadão authority (EST-10).Liveit is non-qualified: it carries no eIDAS qualified status; if it does not issue a stamp the record says so and the request is retried nightly
EST-10Time stamps from outside time-stamping authorities under RFC 3161 are in use: Certum (Poland) stamps records, and the Portuguese state's Cartão de Cidadão authority stamps the estate root. The published estate-root index shows both stamps on every root from 4 October to 8 November 2026 (36 of 36).Livethe stamps show that particular bytes existed by a stated time, subject to the authority; they are not described as qualified; how a time stamp is treated in any proceeding is a legal question MDSL does not advise on; the arrangement still relies on authorities in one region
EST-36The qualified Aruba PEC (Italy) time-stamping authority is contracted, built and tested, and available on request as an opt-in; it is switched on per customer because each stamp is priced (a pack of ten qualified stamps is NZ$50). The offline checking program verifies an Aruba stamp.Built, available on requestthe qualified path is wired for Gateway receipts, Email Decision Record™ receipts, Governance API receipts and Provenance™ day roots; estate roots and Gateway day roots take the standard stamps only; proved on one real ArubaPEC token (stamping a manifest), and it has not yet been used on a customer record; how a qualified timestamp is treated in any proceeding is a legal question MDSL does not advise on
EST-11No New Zealand qualified time-stamp authority exists.Not builtMDSL would welcome a New Zealand organisation in that role; it is a separate initiative and is not assumed to be part of any MIO round
EST-12Sealed records written from 24 September 2026, 11:30 NZST are hash-linked, so a deleted or reordered entry in the middle of a history can be detected.Liveearlier records are not linked retrospectively; removal of the newest entries is not yet detectable (see EST-13)
EST-13Detecting removal of the newest records after a compaction is built and verified in tests; compaction itself has no production caller yet.Built and deployednot available to customers: turning it on needs one further design step and a separate approval; until then removal of the newest entries is not detectable
EST-14Conflicting simultaneous writes to a record's history are detected on the governance-and-audit substrate.Livemost paths refuse a conflicting write; one path, a document saved directly, narrows the exposure window to a single read-then-write rather than closing it; that is a recorded decision
EST-15MDSL holds the signing key for every tenant. For every active Village the proof-signing key sits on a separate signing host that MDSL also operates (EST-16).Livea customer does not hold the key, and MDSL could in principle write records under it; on the separate host the key sits in a different place but is still in MDSL's hands; no tenant count is stated here, and the form 'every active Village' is the operator's of 22 Oct 2026 GW-104 (10 Nov 2026): in the code a Village signs with a local key unless MDSL has moved it to the signing host; the security page now states the per-Village arrangement and the Order Schedule, and production custody for every active Village awaits the operator's confirmation.
EST-16A separate signing host, operated by MDSL, holds the signing key for each Village moved onto it. A 2-of-3 split-key scheme (FROST: the key is generated in shares and no whole key ever exists) is built, tested, deployed to both servers and available on request: a Village is moved onto it by a key ceremony among its three key holders.Built and deployedThe separate host is operated by MDSL: the key is in a different place, but still in MDSL's hands, so a verified record is not protected against rewriting by the platform. What the split protects depends on who the three holders are: if MDSL runs all three hosts, MDSL can still sign; no key holder outside MDSL is named; no Village is on it yet; the script that moves a Village onto it is not written (plan 7.9.3b); the key ceremony program exists (frost-custodian); Gateway receipts need one further custodian setting. GW-104 (10 Nov 2026): in the code a Village signs with a local key unless MDSL has moved it to the signing host; production custody for every active Village awaits the operator's confirmation. 12 test files and 245 tests are written (tests/unit/signing/frost*.test.js, thresholdRegistration.test.js). Operator, 19 Nov 2026: coded, tested and available. Deployed means the application code is on both servers; no custodian host is shown to be running. Built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it.
EST-17A third party can check a downloaded record bundle offline without an MDSL account.Livethe default check uses keys carried in the bundle; an optional check fetches keys from the customer's published identity document; the check shows the record is unchanged since signing, subject to key custody and the timestamp authority, not that its content is true
EST-18A sealed record shows that particular bytes existed and were signed by a particular key at a stated time.Statementsubject to key custody and the timestamp authority; it does not show the content was true, that a person was authorised, that a legal duty was met, or that any harm was prevented
EST-19Spot-checks seeded from public randomness (drand): built and tested in development, not in production.Prototypenot available to customers, not deployed and unaudited; when an audit period begins and ends is still to be decided; the randomness network’s operators include US-headquartered organisations
EST-20MIO-STD-01 is MDSL's draft standard for how records are sealed and timestamped; no external standards body has adopted it.Statementit is a working draft; whether the two-authority estate-root arrangement (EST-10) meets section 5.3.2's plurality and jurisdictional-diversity rules has not been assessed; both authorities sit in the EU; no conformance is claimed
EST-21"Live" in MDSL's pages means a customer uses it in production (today, Village); a product that is built and deployed is "Available on request". Neither status proves that demand exists.Statementthe architecture is the foundation, not proof of demand; paid deployments are how an early commercial phase would test it
EST-22The status statements on the evidence page were checked by AI agents working under John Stroh's direction, against the code and, for sealing, hash-linking and concurrent-write, the live systems.Statementthe checking was done by AI agents; no human reviewer is claimed
EST-25The name MIO is used for three different things: the proposed company, the MIO° prefix on the Conduct Record™ product, and the draft standard MIO-STD-01.StatementThe only sanctioned expansion of MIO in MDSL materials is "Machine Intelligence Omega". No other expansion is used.
EST-26The downloadable offline verifier can check that a record's signer is named by a did:x509 identity whose certificate chain reaches a trust anchor the person checking supplies, at a time they supply.Built and deployedPresent in the verifier served at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/verify-record.js and agenticgovernance.digital/downloads/verify-record.js (same file, observed 19 October 2026). Revocation is not checked, and the time used is the checker's. The platform does not yet sign with certificates, and nothing is wired into a route or customer record. did:x509 is a draft proposal published through the IETF, not adopted by any working group; the code passes all 220 vectors in Microsoft's published set, 65 of which fall within the draft's scope. The code was built by AI agents and reviewed by AI agents in repeated rounds; no person has audited it.
EST-27A zero-knowledge proof that a certificate chains to a given root key and is in date, without showing the certificate, has been generated and checked in research prototypes on two proving systems.PrototypeResearch prototypes on our own machine for a fixed certificate profile, built on two third-party proving tools. No certificate check runs on any blockchain; the daily estate-root hash (EST-29) is a separate matter and In October 2026 an attestation contract was deployed to Midnight’s Preview test network and recorded, with test data, that our own verifier accepted a proof; it did not verify the certificate chain. That test network has since been relaunched and we do not claim the contract exists today. It was a research prototype. Unaudited and not deployed. Built and reviewed by AI agents only.
EST-29One value a day, the hash of the signed daily estate root, is anchored to an insert-once contract on Midnight mainnet (contract 517a75cf…5de7, deployed 12 Nov 2026); the ledger holds a date key and a hash, and no personal or tenant data.Livethe contract records a hash and verifies nothing else; the earlier Preview test contract no longer exists; unaudited; built and reviewed by AI agents
EST-30MDSL's intention is to move what it has built towards open source, in stages. For the rest of the estate, outside the Village Gateway (GTW-06), this is an intention only: nothing has been released, nothing is dated, no licence has been fixed and no stage has been named.Plannedstated as intent only for the estate outside the Village Gateway, where the software is proprietary today and products are available on request (how a Village starts is set out in EST-06); no order, dates or licence are stated; the Village Gateway is dealt with separately, and its release is stated as coming soon (GTW-06)
EST-31MIO, if formed, would earn by sharing in recurring service revenue and would manage the distributors it appoints and support implementation and customer success; MDSL would build and operate the platform and infrastructure. Distributors would be cooperative partners who keep what they charge for their own services and share in subscription revenue.Planneda proposal only: MIO has not been formed, no distributor has been appointed (EST-03), no share or terms have been published or agreed (EST-04), and how the revenue is shared between MDSL and MIO is not settled
EST-32A conformance suite for the offline checker is being prepared; none exists yet.Plannedbeing prepared means not built; no date; MIO-STD-01 remains a draft and none is adopted (EST-20)
EST-33MDSL publishes three sites: amiomega.digital is the hub for MDSL's apps, with the focus on what AI agents may do and the records they leave; mysovereignty.digital is the community platform where Village runs, where members sign in and where the apps are bought and supported, and MDSL's company pages; agenticgovernance.digital carries the research and the Tractatus framework the products draw on.Statementthis describes what the three sites are, not what MIO is; MIO is proposed and has not been formed (EST-01); no licence, date or stage is stated
EST-34The software is built by AI agents under John Stroh's direction, and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it.Statementdescribes how the portfolio was built and checked, not its quality; the operator confirmed on 20 October 2026 that no person has audited the portfolio; see EST-22
EST-35A daily hash of the estate root is anchored on the Midnight main network (EST-29); business records stay on MDSL infrastructure in New Zealand and the EU. Village Gateway is built so that, where Gateway anchoring is switched on for a Village, each of its Gateway receipts is a leaf in that Village's sealed day root, and a proof file links each receipt to the anchored hash; that path is built and tested and has not yet been run on the main network (GW-57).Livethe anchor is one hash a day for the whole estate (EST-29); Gateway day-root sealing is per Village (on for one Village) and joining the estate root needs two further environment switches; the step that carries a Gateway day root into the anchored estate root is built and has not yet been shown on the main network (GW-57); no partnership; built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it
DIR-01Our stated intention is to move what we have built towards open source, in stages. The reason is continuity: a record that has to stay checkable for years should not depend on one company, one founder or an escrow agreement.Plannedfor the estate outside the Village Gateway (dealt with separately in GTW-06) this is an intention only: nothing has been released, no date is set, no licence is fixed and no stage has been named; each stage is released by the operator in writing, and none of these has been; what MDSL sells is the running of it: hosting in New Zealand and the EU, key custody, assurance, accreditation, support and continuity
DIR-02Our direction is a hybrid design: business records stay on infrastructure under New Zealand or EU control, and only fingerprints are committed to a public network.Planneddirection: the daily anchor runs on Midnight mainnet (EST-29); the wider hybrid design is not settled and has no date
EST-37A second signature using ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) is added to Provenance seals, Governance API receipts, Email Decision Record receipts and proof-chain compaction summaries after the classical signature, so a record carries both; the downloadable verifier checks it.Built and deployedswitched on for 34 Villages on the EU host on 26 Oct 2026 and not yet on the NZ host; the first sealed record observed carrying the second signature has not been recorded in any note, so 'every record carries it' is not claimed; the implementation is MDSL's own, in pure JavaScript, not constant-time, tested against the NIST ACVP vectors and cross-checked against two independent implementations; no person has audited it; built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it; it covers the four record kinds named, not invoices or other Village writes; it is a hedge against future key recovery, not a statement that the records are safe against a quantum computer; Village Gateway receipts and exports are covered by GTW-16
EST-38Each offline checking program is published at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/ with its SHA-256, so a reader can confirm that the file they run is the file MDSL published.Built and deployedmeasured 9 Nov 2026 in public/downloads/: eight checking programs (verify-record.js, provenance-verifier.js, consignment-verifier.js, consignment-verifier-v2.js, invoice-bundle-verifier.js, email-decision-record-verifier.js, governance-receipt-verifier.js, gateway-evidence-verifier.js), plus the Email Decision Record checker as one HTML page and the Email Decision Record kit, each with a .sha256 file that matches the file's bytes; each checker's SHA-256 is in its .sha256 file served beside it at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/, which is the reference, because a hash changes whenever a checker is rebuilt; the Village Gateway checker's SHA-256 is 8e3d5579a894f2c264c96d07190e48ab7b1bb9cf2ea6d762e00575c32210acdb in the repository as of 19 Nov 2026, and the file served at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/ had the same SHA-256 when an AI agent read it on 19 Nov 2026; publication for reading and checking is not a licence and not a free version of any product (EST-06, GTW-04); a checker shows a record is unchanged since signing, not that its content is true; built and reviewed by AI agents, no person has audited the checkers
EST-39MDSL describes its products as one product, Village Gateway, with Village as part of it; each earlier product name stays as the name of a function, shown as 'also known as'.Statementdescribes how the products are named, not what is switched on for any customer: each function keeps its own status in the register (GTW-01, GTW-14, CON-01, AVA-01, ACC-01, EDR-01, PRV-02, API-01); Village, the members-only platform, is live, and how a Village starts is set out in EST-06 (VIL-01); the Governance API remains a sandbox (API-01); the earlier names stay in contracts, API paths and the distributor schedule
EST-40No advisor has been appointed, and there is no advisor programme, accreditation, remuneration, advisor pack or advisor terms.Not builtan expression-of-interest page exists at /become-an-advisor.html, linked from no standing page; submitting it creates an enquiry and nothing more; MDSL responds personally; this is not an offer and creates no commitment; Governance and regulated Villages are arranged directly with MDSL (VIL-07)
EST-41A news item dated 16 November 2026 on Monument Bank's site, the site of a UK bank, is headed 'Monument Bank Partners with Midnight to Launch UK's First Tokenized Deposits'. MDSL anchors one hash a day, of its estate root, on Midnight's main network (EST-29). MDSL has no partnership or agreement with Monument Bank or the Midnight Foundation and does not know which ledger or network the bank's product uses.Statementthe headline is the bank's, read on monument.co on 18 Nov 2026, and 'UK's first' is the bank's description; the bank's product page speaks of 'a shared digital ledger' and does not name the network; MDSL has no partnership or agreement with Monument Bank or the Midnight Foundation, neither has endorsed MDSL, and MDSL makes no statement about the bank's product or its terms; MDSL's only use of the network is to write one hash a day to its own contract and read it back, and it runs no other application there
EST-42On 17 November 2026 Microsoft announced an AI Transparency Initiative with more than 40 organisations, to help develop open, industry-wide standards for AI transparency, security and governance, on three principles it names See, Verify and Control; under Verify it says organisations should be able to verify AI activity independently.Statementthis is Microsoft's announcement, read on two Microsoft pages on 19 Nov 2026: the press release dated 17 Nov 2026 gives 'more than 40 organizations' and names the three principles, and the Ignite blog post of the same day says '40 organizations'; MDSL has no connection with the initiative and Microsoft has said nothing about MDSL; the two pages state principles and a plan for open standards, with NIST's agent standards work named; as read that day they do not mention tamper-evidence, signatures, hashes or time-stamps and name no specification, schema, protocol or deadline; this describes two pages on one day, not what Microsoft has built or plans

Village

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
VIL-01Village is a members-only community and organisation platform built and operated by MDSL in New Zealand, for families, clubs, small businesses and governance bodies.Livestatuses come from the code and product documents, not from a check of the live systems; how a Village starts is set out in EST-06: by invitation, or, where MDSL has opened self-service, with a verified payment card
VIL-02Each Village's data is held in New Zealand (Wellington) or the EU (Strasbourg), and each Village is separate from every other.Liveno US-owned provider hosts the records; see EST-07 for the dependencies outside that boundary
VIL-03Every Village has a member directory, channels, events, polls and voting, documents, video calls on self-hosted Jitsi, a constitution log and a Village assistant.Livethe assistant answers from the Village's own content (FAQ retrieval); a fuller AI is included at the top tier and is an add-on below it; GPU capacity limits AI workloads
VIL-04Village is priced at NZ$44, NZ$79 and NZ$114 per month for the Families, Communities & Clubs and Village Small Business tiers, with 200 members included and no per-seat fee.Livethese are the figures on the published pricing page; annual prices are NZ$422, NZ$758 and NZ$1,094; the tiers include 10, 10 and 50 GB of storage and 500, 500 and 2,000 video minutes a month
VIL-05Published add-ons are 25 GB extra storage at NZ$26 a month, 250 extra video minutes at NZ$18, priority AI at NZ$44 and email at NZ$35.Livethese four are the add-ons with a published price; the Sovereign Database is listed on the mysovereignty.digital pricing page from NZ$175 a month, available on request and subject to capacity (see VIL-06)
VIL-06A dedicated Sovereign Database, with the customer's data in its own database on New Zealand infrastructure, is planned; a request can be discussed, subject to capacity.Planneddepends on capacity; MDSL's pricing page at mysovereignty.digital lists it from NZ$175 a month, confirmed by the operator on 20 October 2026; the figure is MDSL's published price, and MIO quotes no price of its own
VIL-07Governance and regulated Village tiers are priced per engagement, are not on the price list, and are arranged directly with MDSL for now.Plannedgovernance queue, audit retention and assurance artefacts are planned, not a listed product; Village Kāhui Māori (for iwi, hapū and Māori organisations) is by arrangement
VIL-08Direct messages are encrypted in transit but are not end-to-end encrypted; the server can read message content.Livedirect messages are encrypted in transit but not end-to-end encrypted
VIL-10Village Assembly puts a question to a Village: an AI-simulated assembly argues it with scrutiny, a contestability report shows where the argument is weak, and the group then takes it to a human phase to decide, with dissent kept word for word.Liveopt-in per Village and set up by MDSL on request, with no self-serve checkout; it is listed on the published pricing page; at the 12 October count it was switched on for one demonstration Village only; the sealing route was deployed on 12 October but no real sealed deliberation is on record yet
VIL-11Open Floor lets members raise ideas in their own words and keeps a minority idea whole instead of averaging it away. Breakdowns for groups below a minimum size are withheld, a result carrying a member’s identifier is refused before it is shown, and each member chooses whether a contribution appears under their name, a pseudonym or anonymously.Liveopt-in per Village and set up by MDSL on request, with no self-serve checkout; it is listed on the published pricing page at a flat price per organisation; at the 12 October count it was switched on for demonstration Villages only; no real sealed result is on record yet
VIL-12Village can read, check and file a Peppol-format (PINT A-NZ) e-invoice file that a signed-in Business user uploads. It does not receive invoices from the Peppol network, and live sending is not connected.Built and deployeddelivery from the network, and live sending, depend on an approved Peppol access point being in place and are not on offer.
VIL-14Village is built with five interface languages: English, German, French, Dutch and te reo Māori.Livethis is Village only; AVA's language menu does not translate (AVA-05); statuses are from code, not a live check
VIL-15Village handles cultural boundaries in code: content marked tapu or restricted can block AI processing, and the code states that AI cannot determine tapu status.Livethis is a content-marking control; it is not an AI judgement of what is tapu
VIL-16Deliberation Village gives a team a map of a topic, team strands, signed records and a ratification step, for working a topic through before it becomes a decision.Livepriced per engagement and arranged with MDSL; at the 12 October count it was switched on for one Village only; no real ratification is on record yet
VIL-17Consolidated Village Consensus draws the answers of several Villages to one question into a single map that keeps each minority position whole and attributed, and the sealed map can be checked offline.Livefor a coordinating Village and its partner Villages, priced per engagement and arranged with MDSL; at the 12 October count it was switched on for demonstration Villages only; no real sealed consensus map is on record yet
VIL-18The Civic Assembly App lets a council or agency run a consultation round: residents enter by an invitation token, contributions are kept whole, and the outcome is a sealed record that a resident can check with a verifier page.Built and deployedswitched on in production on 13 October with one demonstration round; not on the price list and no price has been set; each Village also needs Open Floor switched on; no real sealed consultation is on record yet
VIL-19Payments for what MDSL sells are made through Airwallex (NZ) Limited, the only payment provider; real payments opened on 19 June 2026.LiveEstablished from the go-live record of 19 June 2026; not re-tested since.
VIL-20A Village member can file a data-rights request (access, rectification, erasure, restriction, portability, objection or withdrawal of consent); each carries a 30-day response deadline that the member can see, and the Village’s administrators are emailed when a request needs a person’s decision.LiveEstablished from the code on 19 October 2026 by an AI agent; no person has audited it. The deadline is the one set in the code. Not re-tested against a live Village.
VIL-21Villages can federate: two Villages that each agree can link, with agreements, a federation card that shows only a display name and village name, and, for each member, settings for who may call or message them, including a list of trusted people.LiveEstablished from the code on 19 October 2026 by an AI agent; no person has audited it. It is off by default and works only when both Villages agree and each member opts in; not re-tested against a live pair of Villages, and the number of Villages using it is not stated.
VIL-22A Village member files an access or portability request, confirms it from an email link, and when it is completed the member is emailed a link to the signed-in data-rights page, where a Download button collects the file (JSON).LiveEstablished from the code and a headless render by AI agents on 20 October 2026; no person has audited it. No real request has completed in production yet, so the delivery path has not been seen working on a live Village. The data-rights page is only partly translated (the heading, title and download controls change language; the rest stays in English). Export files have no expiry yet.
VIL-23A Village owner or moderator can export the Village's shared content records, one record type at a time, through the Village's programming interface.LiveEstablished from the code by an AI agent on 20 October 2026; no person has audited it. There is no screen for it: it is used through the programming interface. It covers fourteen content record types. Records marked private or owner-only are left out unless the person exporting wrote them. A record type is refused whole if any record in the batch has no provenance hash, so an export can fail rather than return partial results. Ordinary members can get only hashes or counts; a request from them for full records is refused. Owners and moderators receive the full records. Not re-tested against a live Village.
VIL-09Governance day roots is an add-on at NZ$44 per month excluding tax, published on the pricing page.Built and deployedAdd-ons are arranged on request; none has been purchased through the payment provider.

AVA, the AI Visibility Auditor

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
AVA-01AVA (AI Visibility Auditor) puts the questions an organisation's buyers ask to AI assistants, records each answer verbatim with the model and time, and compares it with what the organisation's own site publishes.Available on requesta gap between an answer and the site is the finding; it is a measurement, not an official ruling or a score of ranking; available on request
AVA-02AVA puts buyer questions to AI assistants through their published interfaces and records each answer with the assistant and the time.Available on requestThe set of assistants used in a run is recorded with that run; the measurement itself reaches mostly US-owned providers, so only the record is sovereign.
AVA-04AVA compares answers with the site and produces findings and draft fixes.Available on requestanything the tool suggests is labelled not an official ruling; verdicts are labelled non-authoritative in the data
AVA-05AVA's interface is in English only; the language menu shows te reo Māori, German, French and Dutch but does not translate the pages.Not builtother languages are planned; the interface works in English only
AVA-06Sealing an AVA run (hash, signature, time-stamp from an outside authority) is built and has run once end to end in testing on a real site; no customer's run has been sealed.Built, available on requestthe seal works in testing; it has not been used on a customer's audit; MDSL holds the signing key; available on request (contracted and built means available on request: operator ruling of 19 August 2026)
AVA-07An offline verification bundle for a sealed AVA run is built, so a third party can check a sealed run without MDSL.Built, available on requestit applies only once a run is sealed, which has not yet been done for a customer
AVA-08A qualified eIDAS timestamp for an AVA run, at NZ$5 each and opt-in, is contracted and tested against the provider’s live endpoint, and available on request as an opt-in; it is switched on per customer because each stamp is priced.Built, available on requesthow it is treated in any proceeding is a legal question MDSL does not advise on; see EST-10
AVA-09AVA has a self-hosted install kit, built and issued by MDSL on request, that lets crawling run from the customer's own network.Built, available on requestit is not a public download; sealing stays with MDSL; the measurement still reaches US-owned assistants
AVA-10AVA is priced at NZ$263 per project per month for ongoing tracking, NZ$526 for a one-off run, and NZ$5 per qualified timestamp (opt-in).Available on requestsealing is built but not yet switched on for customers; available on request; no other price is published
AVA-11The measurement itself is not sovereign, because the questions go to AI assistants mostly run by US companies (OpenAI, Perplexity, Anthropic); only the record is kept in New Zealand or the EU.Available on requestAVA's own FAQ says the same
AVA-12AVA evidences what AI assistants said and when; it does not prevent or change anything.Available on requestits buyer is a governance, risk or regulatory lead who needs a record, not a marketing team wanting a dashboard score

MIO° Conduct Record

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
CON-01MIO° Conduct Record is a sealed register of what an organisation's AI agents are authorised to do, and which agents exist.Available on requestit records authority and does not block anything itself; Village Gateway's mandate check (CON-07) can deny a request that falls outside the mandate in force, where that check is turned on; available on request
CON-02A change to a mandate is a new dated record that supersedes the old one, and the old record is kept.Available on requestthe ordering relies on the platform's own clock, and the lookup says so
CON-03A "mandate in force at time T" lookup is available through the API on both production servers (NZ and EU).Available on requestthe lookup shows what was recorded, as recorded; for every active Village the proof-signing key sits on a separate signing host that MDSL operates (EST-16), and a verified record is not protected against rewriting by the platform operator; each in-force answer carries a caveat that the ordering it relies on is not yet tamper-evident, so a party with write access to the tenant's records could backdate a mandate's recorded time; the product page says so
CON-06An auditor can check a Conduct Record offline without an MDSL account.Available on requestMDSL holds the signing key for every tenant; for every active Village the proof-signing key sits on a separate signing host that MDSL also operates (EST-16).
CON-07Checking an agent's action against its mandate is built in two places, each off until it is turned on: Village Gateway checks any request it governs, where a policy requires a mandate (the action, the resource, the amount and the dates must fall within the mandate in force, or the request is denied); the Email Decision Record compares the action name of an agent's proposed email with the actions the mandate permits.Built, available on requestGateway: needs the mandate link switched on and a version 2 policy with require_mandate 1; a Gateway key must be linked to an agent by the owner; it governs only agents that call Village Gateway and systems that check its permits. Email Decision Record: needs its mandate check switched on; it acts only on a mandate that was found and cited, compares the action name only, and a missing mandate leaves the policy's verdict unchanged. The register itself records authority and does not block anything; built and reviewed by AI agents, no person has audited it.
CON-08Conduct Record is priced at NZ$526 for a Sealed Statement and NZ$263 per agent per month for a Standing Record pilot of up to five agents with a 90-day term.Available on requestavailable on request; no other price is published
CON-09Continuous monitoring of agents has no published price and is not offered.Not builtit awaits an SDK that does not yet exist
CON-10In one reading experiment of MDSL's own, AI models reading 25 invented records against one mandate recognised out-of-mandate acts at 100% for blatant, 92% for moderate and 58% for subtle acts, with zero false positives across 36 clean cases.Available on requestit measures a reviewer reading the record, not a property of the register; model readers only, four planted acts per level, synthetic records, one mandate (docs/plans/archive/PLAN_MIOMEGA_RESUME_20260911.md:108-118); the 58% subtle rate means low sampling rates would miss most isolated subtle acts, so it caps what can be promised; the audit regime is not switched on

Attested Accounts™

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
ACC-01Attested Accounts is an evidence layer over the Business Village's invoicing, quoting, recurring invoicing, expense and time tracking.Available on requestit is not an accounting system, an audit opinion or accounting advice; it signs the Business Village's own invoicing, quotes, expenses and time records; a one-way link that sends expenses to Xero is planned for the Business Village and is not available there today; there is no MYOB or QuickBooks link; it is built into the Business Village and not sold as a separate product
ACC-02Every write to an invoice, quote, recurring invoice, expense or time entry appends a proof-chain entry signed under the tenant's key when it happens; this is part of the Village's sovereign-record layer and has no switch.Livealteration after signing is detectable; it says nothing about whether the figures are right, complete or lawful; the key is held by MDSL (EST-15); if the tenant has no identity key or the signer is down a new entry is written unsigned and an alert is raised; a query update to an existing record of a tenant with no identity key is refused; this is NOT the hash-linked Finance record, day root and estate-root leaf of Attested Accounts (ACC-13), which is switched off by default; established from code by an AI agent on 3 Nov 2026, production state not read
ACC-03Finance records written from 24 September 2026, 11:30 NZST are hash-linked, so a deleted or reordered entry can be detected.Available on requestearlier entries are not linked retrospectively; see EST-12
ACC-04An invoice has an action-history view and a downloadable verification bundle that a third party can check offline.Available on requestinvoices only; the history names a person only for creation, otherwise a system note; quotes, expenses and time entries do not yet have these
ACC-05Quotes, expenses and time entries are sealed but do not yet have a history view, a receipt or a verification bundle.Not builtsealing covers them; the surfaces do not yet exist
ACC-06Erasure requests report which finance records are held under a retention rule and scrub the erasable remainder.Available on requestno retention period is stated on the pages
ACC-07A qualified (RFC 3161, eIDAS) timestamp receipt for one invoice is built and available on request as an opt-in; it is switched on per customer because each receipt is priced.Built, available on requestspend is gated by an allow-list that is empty by design; the paid path was verified by code trace, not live; available on request
ACC-08Batch receipts of up to 1,000 records and ten included receipts a month are not available, although both are stated on the pricing page.Not builtreceipts exist for one invoice at a time and no monthly allowance is enforced
ACC-10The practice-facing console, one view across many small clients, is not built.Not builtit is held until a client-access rule and practice pricing are decided; until then a practice works inside one client's Business Village at a time; the distributor model deliberately grants no access to member content, so it needs a new capability
ACC-11Agentic bookkeeping, and any MIO-STD-01 claim for it, is not built.Not builtnothing on the Attested Accounts pages is a conformance claim
ACC-12Attested Accounts has two published prices: NZ$263 per Village per month on the Attested Accounts page and NZ$114 per month for the Business tier on the Village price list; a pack of 100 Qualified Receipts is NZ$114.Available on requestno distributor or practice rate exists; the receipt pack is priced although qualified receipts are not switched on for any customer; access is arranged directly with John Stroh
ACC-13The Attested Accounts Finance record (a hash-linked chain of invoice events, a per-tenant day root and a leaf in the daily estate root) is built and tested and is switched off by default behind three switches: a platform switch, an estate-root switch and the Village's own setting. It is available on request.Built, available on requestFINANCE_RECORD_ENABLED, ESTATE_ROOT_INCLUDE_FINANCE and settings.financeRecord.enabled must all be exactly on; no Village is recorded as having it on; production switch values were not read; there is no cheaper unsealed tier and no stripped accounts-only product; the per-write signed proof chain (ACC-02) is on regardless; established from code and tests by AI agents, no person has audited it
ACC-14Attested Accounts can read, check and file a Peppol-format (PINT A-NZ) e-invoice file that a signed-in Business user uploads. It does not receive invoices from the Peppol network, and live sending is not connected.Built and deployedPeppol is the international network for sending invoices directly between accounting systems; delivery from the network, and live sending, depend on an approved Peppol access point being in place and are not on offer. Sending is built through a Peppol access-point provider the tenant chooses from a screened list and holds its own account with.
ACC-15Distributor provisioning for Attested Accounts is switched off by design.Not builtthe distributor model never grants member-content access; no distributor wholesale terms, portal or practice console exist
ACC-16An Attested Accounts invoice can carry a lot reference, a quantity and a unit that are committed together, so that an invoice can be tied to a lot.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed 22 Oct 2026; the three lot fields are set together or none; an invoice without them behaves as before; the link shows that the invoice names the lot, not that the goods or figures are right; the invoice has no day root or outside time stamp; built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it
ACC-17An invoice can be shared as a redactable member: every field is held as a salted hash and only lot reference, quantity, unit, currency, total and date can be shown; an offline checker, served for download, recomputes the hashes and checks the signed record behind the invoice.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed 22 Oct 2026; the checker is served at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/invoice-bundle-verifier.js and agenticgovernance.digital/downloads/invoice-bundle-verifier.js, SHA-256 96ac2ac454da385d1f0b93ed2040e2bbb1959973135af57820161ad64da5111f; a hidden field shows that it exists and has not changed, not what it says; it does not show the figures are right, complete or paid; the invoice member has no day root or outside time stamp of its own; Attested Accounts day roots are not built, so invoices are not in the estate root; the consignment routes can include an invoice by invoice_id, switched on per Village on request; built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it

Governance API

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
API-01The Governance API is an interface other software calls before an AI agent acts: a proposed action goes in and a verdict of allow, gate (a human decides) or deny comes back with coarse reason codes and an Ed25519-signed receipt.Built and deployedavailable on request, today as a sandbox only: access is a one-time token tied to a single address, and no production keys are issued (API-02, API-05); the caller's own system must act on the verdict
API-02Sandbox access is by invitation from John Stroh, issued as a one-time token tied to a single address.Available on requesta request form on the pricing page is an enquiry and creates no right to access; access is at MDSL's discretion, by one-time token; the sandbox is for building and testing an integration
API-03In the sandbox the verdict comes from a simple rule table, and its receipts are labelled non-authoritative.Available on requestsandbox receipts are not a governance decision a customer should rely on
API-04The full decision engine, with action classification, is built and deployed, and switched off.Built and deployedit is not offered: sandbox verdicts come from a simple rule table and are labelled not authoritative, and the engine’s authoritative verdicts begin only when MDSL decides to switch it on; a corpus-based content check of kōrero claims is a second flag, also off
API-05No production keys are issued.Plannedthey follow published terms of service and a data processing agreement, both still drafts, and a security review; no date
API-06A receipt can be verified offline against the tenant's DID document with the client verifier, without any call to MDSL.Built, available on requestsandbox receipts are non-authoritative; the record of the deliberation is held in the customer's own tenant in New Zealand or the EU and can be exported as a self-verifying dossier
API-07The Governance API is offered only as an add-on to a Village; there is no API-only plan.Available on requestevery customer must also be a Village
API-08Governance API prices (Governance Standard, Governance Plus, Assurance) are given on request and none is published.Plannedno production key can be issued yet and no figure is quoted
API-12An independent penetration test of the API has not been done; its scope of work is drafted and has not been sent.Not builtsandbox access is tied to it in the published wording
API-13The Governance API sandbox was reviewed by an experienced architect, as an expert peer review.Available on requestThe reviewer is a design partner, so this is peer review and not arm’s-length assurance. It is not an independent penetration test (API-12). Adversarial review by AI agents that did not build the API, and automated scanning, were done as well.

The SSST design

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
SST-01SSST is the design MDSL applies across its products; AVA, Conduct Record and Attested Accounts each seal records on it.Available on requestit is not sold on its own; each product implements it separately; it is the reason a product can make an evidence claim, not a guarantee of one
SST-02Sealing (hash, signature, time-stamp from an outside authority) is deployed in production for Conduct Record and Attested Accounts, and built and tested end to end for AVA, not yet used on a customer’s audit.Available on requestper-product status differs; see AVA-06

Email Decision Record

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
EDR-01Signing keys are held apart from the application that writes records, for each tenant moved to the separate signing host.Built, available on requestOnly for tenants moved to the separate signing host. Not every tenant is on it yet, and the Order Schedule states which applies.
EDR-02A held email is released or refused by an approver, through a route that records who decided.Built, available on requestBuilt and reviewed by AI agents. No customer is live yet.
EDR-03Each proposed email is checked against the owner's policy before it can be sent.Built, available on requestThe owner's policy is applied. A person still approves a held email.
EDR-04Records are held in New Zealand or the European Union.Built and deployedOn servers we rent in the European Union and New Zealand. Your Order Schedule states which applies to you.
EDR-05Mail can be sent through a Microsoft or a Google account that the subscriber connects.Built, available on requestDescriptive use only. Google's app is in testing mode, so it is available to named test users only.
EDR-06The Email Decision Record may be introduced by an appointed distributor once MDSL has its first paying subscriber and has said so in writing; MDSL contracts and sets it up.Plannedintroduce only; no price is published; no distributor has been appointed, so this is not available through a distributor now
EDR-07The Email decision record plan prices are published on the pricing page and the product page (Standard NZ$495, Assured NZ$1,650, Enterprise from NZ$4,000 per month, excluding tax).Built and deployedPublished prices only. Add-ons are arranged on request; none has been purchased through the payment provider.
EDR-08Client-side gates for six agent frameworks (Google ADK, Microsoft Agent Framework, Strands Agents, LangChain, the OpenAI Agents SDK and the Claude Agent SDK) put each gated tool call to the customer's Email Decision Record first and let the tool run only on an allow that names a receipt; a refusal, a hold, an endpoint timeout or any error the gate catches stops the tool. In the Claude Agent SDK a failure of the hook itself at the SDK lets the tool run. The tool's arguments do not leave the customer's process: the gate sends the tool's name, a SHA-256 fingerprint of the arguments, the call's identifiers (such as session, agent and call ids) and a timestamp. Each is available for evaluation on request.Available on requestgates the tools the customer's own code runs through the framework and registers with the gate; tools on the customer's exempt list, provider-hosted tools, a tool called directly outside the agent's tool loop and, in the OpenAI Agents SDK, handoffs, hosted, computer and shell tools and agents used as tools are not gated; the Claude Agent SDK gate depends on the timeout order set out in its README; the Email Decision Record decides on a short email-shaped message naming the tool, not on the tool's arguments; the gate checks that a receipt is named and does not verify its signature; with a receipt folder set, each permitted call's receipt is saved so the customer can check it offline with the Email Decision Record verifier; sent by MDSL as a folder with the shared core and an Email Decision Record key, not served from a public address; not deployed and not yet run against MDSL's own endpoint: the test suites (488 test functions, 1,908 test cases across the six and the shared core) passed on 18 Nov 2026 against the newest version of each framework that PyPI served that day (Microsoft Agent Framework installed with pre-releases allowed), using the repository's own stand-in for the endpoint, with none failed or skipped; separately from that run, the Claude Agent SDK gate has been run once with a real Claude model driving the agent, against the local stand-in endpoint (its README, 'What it does not cover'); no framework vendor has agreed to, supported or certified any of them; built and reviewed by AI agents
SCM-01The one-email check lets a person with no account send in one email they are unsure about and get one result back, showing what was checked and what each check found, with a signed record of the check that carries no text of the message.Built and deployedthe check may be off at the host, because it works only while one switch that MDSL alone sets is on, and when it is off the page says the check is paused; the switch was not re-read at either host on 16 Nov 2026, though it was switched on at the EU host on 26 Oct 2026 and an acceptance run through the served page passed there; one message in, one result out, no account and no stored workspace: the single exception the operator authorised on 26 Oct 2026, and nothing wider; the message is not kept, but the result stays at its own address for 24 hours and then is deleted, and anyone who holds that address can read it; the signed record carries no text of the message but does carry a fingerprint of its bytes and its size, so sending the same message again returns the same record; every result is worded as checked, not guaranteed safe; it does not scan for malware, opens no attachment, fetches no link, and the check against reported links is not consulted; a message is limited in size and the door has hourly and daily limits, so it can refuse a genuine use; the page needs JavaScript in the browser; a short code worked out from the signed record, alone or combined with other records of the same day, may be sent to an outside time-stamping authority, when the check is made or afterwards, and the message is not; the number of per-record stamps is capped each day; built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it

Provenance

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
PRV-01Provenance is priced at NZ$495 per exporting organisation per month (Chain: up to five signing organisations and 2,000 sealed records a month), NZ$1,650 per month (Chain Plus: up to 25 signing organisations, 10,000 sealed records and 250 per-record qualified time stamps a month), and from NZ$4,000 per month for an industry scheme; a further signing organisation is NZ$114 per month, a further 1,000 sealed records NZ$114, a per-record qualified time stamp NZ$5, the split-key key ceremony NZ$950 one-off, and a certifier or auditor NZ$263 per month with 1,000 attestations.Available on requestavailable on request, with no self-service signup; no other price is published; no pilot or evaluation price exists; the dossier check is free of charge by design and is not a tier
PRV-02Provenance is available on request; evaluation access is a one-time link issued at MDSL's discretion; there is no self-service signup, trial or free tier.Available on requestthe pricing page states this once, beside the plans
PRV-03Checking a Provenance dossier needs no account and is free of charge: the check runs in the reader's own browser, offline.Available on requesta property of the checker, not a plan or a tier; it says what was and was not established
EST-28Provenance has been built to hold the signing key in three ways: by the platform, which MDSL operates, under a standing authorisation the owner gives (the default); split with the platform so the two must sign together; or split among the organisation's own key holders with no share held by the platform. In both split arrangements a missing share means nothing is signed.Built and deployedThe default arrangement is in operation. The two split arrangements are built and tested and no tenant is on either. An owner can request a switch (passkey or two-step code); completing one needs the key holders named and the key generated with them; the key ceremony program exists (frost-custodian); the step that carries an owner's request through to it has not been built (plan 7.9.3b). Established from code on 19 October 2026 by an AI agent; no person has audited it.

The consignment file

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
CSN-01The platform can assemble a consignment file: a Provenance dossier and an Email Decision Record dossier in one file that can be checked offline, with a signed email record linked to the lot by its lot reference; with an optional invoice_id the same routes produce a three-member version 2 file that includes the invoice.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed 21-22 Oct 2026; the invoice option was deployed 22 Oct 2026, needs a lot reference the lot has offered, refuses uniformly and is switched on per Village on request; the invoice member has no day root or outside time stamp of its own and invoices are not in the estate root; Provenance and the Email Decision Record are on request and no customer is claimed; the file shows records are unchanged since signing and what they link to, not that goods match the paper, that any rule is met, that a record is complete or who wrote an email; membership of the file is not attested; built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it
CSN-02A stranger can check a consignment file offline with one readable JavaScript file, SHA-256 41196ba26ea603979d347e236cd57c43ac3d2a1514a198555d5551ab2468d98a, served at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/ and agenticgovernance.digital/downloads/.Available on requestneeds Node.js; runs each member checker with no network and refuses a member checker whose bytes do not match the published SHA-256; this version checks the Provenance and Email Decision Record members; the invoice is checked with its own checker, or with version 2 (CSN-04); the checker was built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it
CSN-03An owner can propose sending a consignment file to one outside recipient through the Email Decision Record; the proposal is always held for a second approver, never the sender, and is released through the existing release machinery.Built and deployedbuilt and deployed 22 Oct 2026; one recipient per proposal; the recipient class is recorded in the signed record, behind a flag that is off by default; a person still approves; the record shows which login or key was used, not who wrote the text; built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it
CSN-04Version 2 of the consignment checker folds the invoice member into the single offline check, alongside the Provenance and Email Decision Record members; it is served for download at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/consignment-verifier-v2.js and agenticgovernance.digital/downloads/consignment-verifier-v2.js, SHA-256 9bdf86820abef381afd036ad86013c05d1f9f65b49e6bd535d7813eded7c5fa0.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed 22 Oct 2026, with the download checked independently; the HTTP routes POST /api/consignments and POST /api/consignments/send take an optional invoice_id and then produce a three-member version 2 file, checked by consignment-verifier-v2.js (live since 12:50 NZDT 22 Oct 2026); the invoice must carry a lot reference the lot has offered; every refusal is uniform; switched on per Village on request; a version 1 file is checked exactly as before; without a pinned key the invoice reads key_not_pinned, never verified; the invoice member has no day root or outside time stamp of its own; Attested Accounts day roots are not built, so invoices are not in the estate root; built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it

Village Gateway

IDStatementStatusQualifierAs at
GTW-01Village Gateway is built and deployed on our EU production host as an access and approval layer: an agent or person's request to act is checked against the Village's policy, a decision is recorded with a signed receipt, an approval-gated request waits for a different approver, and an allowed request gets a one-use permit that a resource redeems exactly once.Built and deployedarranged for one Village at a time on request, in two ways only: MDSL switches it on for a Village it has agreed to arrange it for, and a Village created through an evaluation link has it switched on, with the four starting categories installed in the owner’s name, when the owner confirms their email address, while its 30-day evaluation is running; that is not retroactive; a purchase does not switch it on by itself (a purchase starts from a running evaluation); ending or cancelling an evaluation releases the Village’s categories and does not by itself switch Village Gateway off; one full decision has run end to end on MDSL’s own systems, and Village Gateway is available on request, which does not mean customers use it (EST-21); the receipts are signed under MDSL-held keys (EST-15); the link to Conduct Record mandates is built and switched off, so no Gateway decision is checked against a mandate today; Village Gateway does not use Governance API verdicts today (read 14 Nov 2026); built and reviewed by AI agents; no person has audited it
GTW-02An AI agent can reach Village Gateway through an MCP adapter with three tools: ask for a decision, read a decision, and take a permit for an allowed decision.Built and deployedthe adapter answers 404 for every Village until Village Gateway is on for that Village; it is on for a Village created through an evaluation link once its owner confirms their email address (GTW-01), and for a Village MDSL arranges it for; no agent framework has used it outside tests
GTW-03A reference resource shows how a protected system redeems a Gateway permit over HTTP: an allowed request executes exactly once, an approval-gated request waits and executes once after approval, and the resource reports the outcome back to the record.Built and deployeda reference implementation exercised in tests over real HTTP; no customer resource is connected; the outcome report is authorised by possession of the spent permit
GTW-04A decision record can be exported with its approvals, receipt and events, and an offline checker (Node 20, no network, no product installed) verifies the export against a bundle of public keys.Built and deployedthe checker is served for reading and checking with its SHA-256 and two synthetic samples; the operator decided on 3 Nov 2026 that it may be offered with a published hash; publication of a checker is not a licence of anything; the checking program verifies an RFC 3161 time-stamp token offline when the export carries one (the stamp's chain must end on a root pinned in the file); one receipt on MDSL's own systems has been stamped and checked with the published program (GTW-07); the synthetic sample's receipt was made before any stamp was obtained, so run on the sample it exits 1 by design; reconciled 9 Nov 2026: since the operator’s decision of 3 Nov 2026 the checker may be described as downloadable and served with its published SHA-256 (the security page says the checking programs are downloadable and each is published with its SHA-256); the phrase “download the verifier today” is no longer barred, and the bar is now on presenting the checker as a download or a free version of the product (the limited evaluation the operator confirmed on 3 Nov 2026 is a separate matter)
GTW-05Policies are organised by category: the server resolves a category from the action, a policy profile folds deny over gate over allow, versions are immutable and activated atomically, and a decision is re-checked at approval and at permit if the profile changed. Four seed categories ship as templates.Built, available on requestdeployed; since 6 Nov 2026 a Village created through an evaluation link has the four starting categories installed in the owner’s name when the owner confirms their email address (see GTW-01); no other Village has categories installed unless its admin installs them; a Village admin can create and activate versions through routes, there are no screens; the four seeds are templates an operator installs, not a standard; the per-category price is shown on the pricing page, and billing for it is built and switched on: the evaluation request page serves its card sentence; the link to Conduct Record mandates is off; the additional time-stamp authorities are built and available, switched on by one estate setting (its production value was not read for this entry); a Village in its 30-day evaluation can add a card and choose categories; no real charge has yet been recorded
GTW-06MDSL intends to release the Village Gateway as open source, and that release is coming soon.Plannedan intention, stated as coming soon on the operator's rulings of 19 and 20 Nov 2026: no date is set and nothing has been published; no download, free copy or community edition is offered; what MDSL sells is the running of it (DIR-01); it changes nothing about the rest of the estate (EST-30)
GTW-07Village Gateway sends every receipt it signs to an outside time-stamping authority (Certum as standard). Where the estate switch is on, a receipt is also sent to BOSA (Belgium), CESNET (Czechia) and the Portuguese state's Cartão de Cidadão authority, and each stamp that comes back is kept. Where qualified stamps are switched on for a customer, a receipt can also take a stamp from the qualified ArubaPEC (Italy), priced per stamp. The checking program verifies every stamp offline when an export carries one. Another authority can be built in on request. The run of record: on 4 Nov 2026 a decision was held, approved with a step-up sign-in, given a one-use permit and exported, and the checking program returned verified, including the Certum stamp.Built and deployedstamping runs in the background after the receipt is signed and a nightly pass retries the ones that missed, so an export taken before the stamp arrives reads incomplete; how many production receipts actually carry a stamp has not been read from the database; the end-to-end check was one decision on one Village on MDSL’s own systems on 4 Nov 2026 with the build of the checking program served that day, and the served program was rebuilt later that day and was not re-run for this entry; built and reviewed by AI agents, no person has audited it; the checking program accepts stamps from five authorities (GTW-08), but each receipt is sent to Certum alone unless the estate switch for the additional authorities (BOSA, CESNET, Portugal) is on; it is off by default and its production value has not been read; no Gateway receipt has yet taken an ArubaPEC stamp (GTW-15); qualified stamps are sold in packs of ten (NZ); a qualified stamp needs the host switch, a per-Village entitlement, a pack and a monthly cap (default 5 per Village per UTC month); 'another authority can be built in on request' rests on the 9 Nov 2026 precedent (GW-80c added Portugal as a further authority behind the estate switch) and the operator's statement of 19 Nov 2026; available on request
GTW-08The offline checking program verifies a stamp from any of five European time-stamping authorities: Certum (Poland), BOSA (Belgium), CESNET (Czechia), the Portuguese state's Cartão de Cidadão authority and the qualified ArubaPEC (Italy). It needs no account and no network.Built and deployedthe checking program pins, by public-key hash, four root certificates (the two Certum roots, Belgium Root CA6 for BOSA and CESNET CA Root) and one issuing certificate compiled into the program, Portugal's 'EC de Assinatura Digital Qualificada do Cartão de Cidadão 0018'; 0018 is an intermediate, not a root, and is accepted as the end of a chain only because its key hash is pinned: the chain above it is not followed and its own signature is not checked; that pinned Portuguese key belongs to a certification authority that also issues citizens' qualified signing certificates, so trust in a Portuguese stamp rests on that one key plus the check that the signing certificate is marked critically for time stamping, and nothing narrower; a stamp verifies only if its chain ends on a pinned key, and an export is refused whole if any stamp in it does not; names and policies are not constrained; proved with one real token from each authority (BOSA and CESNET requested once on 7 Nov 2026 over a test imprint, Portugal on 6 Oct 2026 over a throwaway digest, Certum from the earlier fixture), not with a production receipt; this says what the checking program accepts, not how many authorities stamp a receipt: Gateway receipts are stamped by the primary authority (Certum) alone unless the estate switch for additional authorities is on; it is off by default and its production value was not read for this entry; 0018 and the Portuguese signing certificate are listed in the Portuguese trusted list (sequence 122) but that list's XML signature was not checked, the Belgian trusted list was read but its signature was not checked, and whether CESNET is on the Czech trusted list was not checked; certificate revocation is not checked; built and reviewed by AI agents, no person has audited it; since 19 Nov 2026 it also compiles in the ArubaPEC root (Italy), TIMESTAMP_ROOTS version 2026-11-19.1; the Aruba stamp has been verified on one real token from 15 Sep 2026 that stamps a manifest, not a Gateway receipt, and its signing certificate is on the Italian trusted list as a qualified time-stamping service (status granted since 27 Nov 2017); a qualified ArubaPEC stamp is available on request and no stamp from any other authority is presented as qualified on a customer record
GTW-09A Village Gateway permit lasts at most five minutes and never outlasts the decision that allowed it.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed on both hosts (switched on at the EU host only, GTW-01) and reachable only where Village Gateway is switched on for the Village (GTW-01 says where); it has no switch of its own; no customer has used it; built and reviewed by AI agents; the five-minute default is set in code and the hard ceiling is fifteen minutes; a decision with under five seconds left gets no permit
GTW-10A request held for approval lapses after 24 hours, and the lapse is written to the decision's record.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed on both hosts (switched on at the EU host only, GTW-01) and reachable only where Village Gateway is switched on for the Village (GTW-01 says where); it has no switch of its own; no customer has used it; built and reviewed by AI agents; there is no background sweep: the lapse is written when the decision is next read, approved or asked for a permit, and until then it is worked out from the stored time
GTW-11The Village owner can stop Village Gateway in one step: outstanding permits are withdrawn, and nothing is decided, approved or redeemed until the owner lifts the stop.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed on both hosts (switched on at the EU host only, GTW-01) and reachable only where Village Gateway is switched on for the Village (GTW-01 says where); it has no switch of its own; no customer has used it; built and reviewed by AI agents; owner only, with a fresh step-up sign-in, never an API key; new requests receive a signed denial; held requests keep their hold and lapse on their own; agent keys are not revoked by the stop
GTW-12The Village owner can set a spending limit on each agent key, per currency, per day, week or month; a request over the limit is refused, not held.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed on both hosts (switched on at the EU host only, GTW-01) and reachable only where Village Gateway is switched on for the Village (GTW-01 says where); it has no switch of its own; no customer has used it; built and reviewed by AI agents; a request in a currency none of the key's limits names is refused; a request with no amount is not counted; a held request is checked again when its permit is issued
GTW-13An agent cannot approve a request, its own or any other: the MCP adapter and the machine API have no approve action, and approval needs a signed-in Village owner or moderator (a stored administrator role reads as a moderator) who is not the person behind the requesting key. Each approval made with a passkey is signed on the approver's own device over the exact action; the Village owner's exported record carries that signature and the offline checking program verifies it.Built and deployedbuilt, tested and deployed on both hosts (switched on at the EU host only, GTW-01) and reachable only where Village Gateway is switched on for the Village (GTW-01 says where); it has no switch of its own; no customer has used it; built and reviewed by AI agents; approval also needs a fresh step-up sign-in; the human routes refuse API keys and agent bearer tokens before anything else; from release 135 (19 Nov 2026): a customer who keeps its own list of approver key fingerprints can give it to the checking program, which then fails any approval that is unsigned or signed by a key not on the list; without that list the link between a key and a person rests on MDSL's record; approvals made with an authenticator code or a password are recorded and exported but carry no approver signature (the checking program reports 'not checked' when no approval in the record is signed, and counts the unsigned ones when some are); the signature is in the Village owner's export, which names the approvers, and not in the machine export, which does not
GTW-14Village Gateway is available on request. MDSL arranges it for one Village at a time.Available on requestdescribes how Village Gateway is obtained, not who uses it (EST-21); a Village has it only once MDSL has arranged it for that Village, and MDSL confirms for each request whether and when that can be done; a Village created through an evaluation link has it once its owner confirms their email address, while its 30-day evaluation runs (EST-06); what it does is set out in GTW-01
GTW-15Village Gateway can take a qualified time-stamp from ArubaPEC (Italy) on a receipt, with a ledger and a monthly cap per customer; a pack of ten qualified stamps is NZ$50.Built, available on requestneeds the host switch, a per-Village entitlement and a pack; the monthly cap defaults to 5 per Village per UTC month; built and tested (27 tests); the served offline checker verifies an Aruba stamp, proved on one real ArubaPEC token that stamps a manifest; no Gateway receipt is claimed to have taken an Aruba stamp (production state not read for this entry); built and reviewed by AI agents
GTW-16Village Gateway receipts and decision records can carry a second signature using ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204), added after the classical signature where the account has it switched on, and the offline checking program verifies it and has an option to require it.Built and deployedbuilt behind two host switches (PQ_HYBRID_ENABLED and GATEWAY_PQ_ENABLED) and a per-Village setting (src/services/pq/gatewayPqSidecar.js); the production value of the two host switches was not read for this entry; the receipt's second signature is made shortly after the decision is stored and travels beside the receipt in the exported record, and the export's is made when the export is taken; if the post-quantum signing fails or times out the record keeps its classical signature and is not withheld, which is what the checking program's --require-post-quantum option is for; the estate-record signing in EST-37 has been switched on for 34 Villages on the EU host since 26 Oct 2026 and not yet on the NZ host; the implementation is MDSL's own (see EST-37: pure JavaScript, not constant-time); it is a hedge against future key recovery, not a statement that records are safe against a quantum computer; built and reviewed by AI agents, no person has audited it
GTW-17Where Gateway anchoring is switched on for a Village, Village Gateway seals each event of a decision and each approval into that Village's day root every night, so that a change to an approver, an approval or an event after the night it was sealed shows up: the server refuses to export a record that no longer matches its seal, and the offline checking program recomputes the events from an export that names its approvers and fails the check on a change. Given an anchor proof for that night that the reader already holds or has confirmed on the ledger, the check holds even against an export signed again.Built and deployedbuilt; sealing runs only for a Village with Gateway anchoring switched on (EST-35 says where), from the first nightly seal after the release that carries it, and that first seal has not yet been read in production; the seal shows a change made after the night an event or approval was sealed, so one changed before its first nightly seal is sealed as found; approvals that existed before 19 November 2026 are sealed from the next nightly seal after that date, and the checking program says how many days after the approval that was; older decisions export as 'not yet sealed' until the Village's nightly seal catches up (capped per night); offline, the day root an export names is the export's own statement unless the anchor proof is given (--anchor-proof), and the proof covers only the night the receipt was sealed; a server that leaves out a decision's latest events and their approvals and presents the earlier state still passes the offline check, the latest state being covered only by the export signature, and someone with direct database access who removes a night's last sealed rows is caught only at the next nightly seal; in the export that does not name approvers, a holder who already knows a candidate approver's id can test it against a sealed event; only a decision's own events and approvals are sealed: authority, spending-limit, key, category, stop and lift rows, the owner's export-viewed rows and malformed events are not; a night sealed under a Village's earlier identifier (DID) is not re-checked against the estate root; the checking program published before 19 November 2026 answers 'unknown version' on a new export, so use the current one (EST-38); the anchor proof is itself a file the Gateway returns and the checking program reads no ledger, so against an export signed again the check holds only with a proof the reader already held before the change, or one whose estate root the reader has confirmed on the ledger (--anchor-check); carrying a Gateway day root into the anchored estate root has not yet been shown on the main network (EST-35); built and reviewed by AI agents, no person has audited it
GTW-18A passkey approval in Village Gateway is signed on the approver's own device over a challenge the server computes from the exact action and the approver's user id; a passkey can approve a given decision once, so one passkey cannot stand as two approvers of that decision; and the offline checking program verifies each signature in the Village owner's export, with an option to accept only the approver keys you list.Built and deployedbuilt; passkey signing and the listed-keys option are deployed (GTW-13); naming the approver in the challenge, the one-passkey-per-decision rule, the counter check and --allow-approver-v1 come with the release that carries this entry and have not yet been observed in production; a signature is made only for an approval made with a passkey (an approval made with a two-step code or a password carries no signature and the check reads not_checked); the signature is in the Village owner's export, not in the machine export (GTW-13); the approval page shows the action as the server lists it, so what the person saw is not itself signed; the signature carries no time, and the key an approver pins is the key the server returned (trust on first use), so a key obtained from the approver's own device is the stronger pin; an approval signed before the approver was named in the challenge passes the pinned check only with --allow-approver-v1; a database index holds one signed approval per passkey per decision: it does not stop one passkey registered to two accounts approving two different decisions, and two different passkeys held by one person are not detected; an authenticator that counts its uses is accepted and a count that does not move forward is refused; a sign-in challenge made for another purpose cannot be spent as a Gateway approval; built and reviewed by AI agents, no person has audited it